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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRUCE T. WORTHEN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
SHURTLEFF AND 
ANDREWS, INC., 
a corporation, 
vs. 
Defendant, 
THE DEPARTMENT OF 
FINANCE, Successor of THE 
COMMISSION OF FINANCE, 
Administrator of THE STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, 
Intervenor and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10651 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action was commenced by Bruce Worthen 
to recover damages from the defendant, Shurtleff 
and Andrews, Inc., for injuries received in an in-
dustrial accident which occurred while Bruce 
Worthen was working for H. E. Lowder Milk Com-
pany, while he was in the course and scope of his 
employment. He received medical payments and 
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workmen's compensation from his employer's car-
rier, the State Insurance Fund. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Trial of the main action was before the Hon-
orable A. H. Ellett sitting with a jury in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. The action was settled during trial 
for $60,000.00. After discussions with counsel the 
Court directed that the amount of the settlement 
be deposited with the Clerk of Court and payable 
to Bruce Worthen, The State Insurance Fund and 
Edward M. Garrett, attorney. An Order was then 
entered allowing Bruce Worthen to withdraw all 
funds deposited except the amount paid by the State 
Insurance Fund for medical expense and workmen's 
compensation. The Court then directed that the 
Department of Finance appear and show cause why 
it should not pay 25 5{:- of the retained amount as 
attorney's fees. Before hearing on the matter the 
facts of the workman's compensation and medical 
pay were stipulated to by counsel and the Court 
thereupon entered its Order providing in substance 
that the Commission of Finance was obligated to 
pay 25 % of the retained amount as attorney's fees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Commission of Finance seeks a reversal of 
the Court Order compelling it to pay attorney's 
fees. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts contained in the brief 
of Intervenor and Appellant is correct. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COMPENSATION CARRIER MUST PAY ITS 
PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF COSTS AND ATTOR-
NEYS FEES AND ITS RECOVERY IS REDUCED BY 
THAT AMOUNT. 
The sole purpose of this Appeal is to re-examine 
the reasoning in McConnell vs. The Commission of 
Finance, 13 Utah 2nd 395, 375 Pac. 2nd 394, as 
concerns the obligation of The State Insurance Fund 
to pay attorney's fees on its share of the recovery 
in a Third Party Tort action. 
The statute involved is 35-1-62 UCA 1953 and 
reads as follows: 
When any injury or death for which compen-
sation is payable under this title shall have 
been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another person not in the same employment, 
the injured employee, or in case of death his 
dependents, may claim compensation and the 
injured employee or his heirs or personal rep-
resentative may also have an action for dam-
ages against such third person. If compen-
sation is claimed and the employer or insur-
ance carrier becomes obligated to pay com-
pensation, the employer or insurance carrier 
shall become trustee of the cause of action 
against the third party and may bring and 
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maintain the action either in its own name or 
in the name of the injured employee, or his 
heirs or the personal representative of the 
deceased, provided the employer or canie1· 
may not settle and release the cause of action 
without the consent of the commission. 
If any recovery is obtained against such 
third person it shall be disbursed as follows: 
( 1) The reasonable expense of the ac-
tion, including attorneys' fees, shall be paid 
and charged proportionately against the par-
ties as their interests may appear. 
( 2) The person liable for compensation 
payments shall be reimbursed in full for 
all payments made. 
( 3) The balance shall be paid to the in-
jured employee or his heirs in case of death, 
to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any 
obligation thereafter accruing against the 
person liable for compensation. 
In the case of McConnell vs. The Commission of 
Finance, 13 - Utah 2nd 395, 375 Pac. 2nd 394, this 
Court held under identical facts that the State In-
surance Fund was not obligated to pay a propor-
tionate share of the attorneys fees incurred in gain-
ing a recovery in that action. 'The Court stated: 
( 1) That the State Insurance Fund was 
not a party to the action. 
(2) That since the statute provides that the 
insurance carrier must be reimbursed in full, 
that the carrier would not be liable for its 
proportionate share of costs and fees. 
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We think the Court has erred in its interpre-
tation of this statute. 
Seemingly, there exists an inconsistency or con-
flict in sub-sections 1 and 2 in the statute. Under 
Sub-section 1 each party is charged a proportionate 
share of the costs of the action. Under sub-section 
2 provision is made that the insurance carrier must 
be reimbursed for all payments made. Clearly, an 
insurance carrier cannot pay its share of the costs 
and be reimbursed in full at the same time. It 
doesn't add up. Our purpose here is to show that 
these sections can be reconciled and each given 
effect. In so doing the reasoning in the McConnell 
case, supra, must fall. 
The first sub-section of the statute provides 
that the expense including attorneys fees of the law 
suit shall be paid and charged proportionately 
against the parties as their interests may appear. 
The statute in sub-section 1 by its language 
obviously contemplates the fact that there are two 
parties involved in this type of Third Party law 
suit, namely, the injured employee and the insurance 
carrier. The statute visualizes a situation wherein 
an injured party has a Third Party case which is 
worth more in damages than the total of the medical 
expense and compensation paid by the insurance 
carrie1· to date. This Court has recognized this in 
its derision in Rogalski vs. Phillips Petroleum Com-
po11y, 3, Utah 2nd 203, 282 Pac. 2nd 304. The Court 
in that case decided that the language of the statutr 
gives the insurance carrier a right of action but 
this is not a restriction on the injured employee 
who also has a cause of action against the Third 
Party. 
The Court in the McConnell case, supra, seems 
to indicate that only when the compensation carrier 
is a party to the action does a situation arise where 
sub-section 1 of the statute has any application. In 
other words, if the injured employee files a law suit 
and recovers from the Third Party there is no room 
for the application of sub-section 1 because the com-
pensation carrier must be reimbursed in full pur-
suant to sub-section 2. We do not believe that the 
legislature intended that the word "Party" should 
have such a narrow and restricted meaning. The 
appropriate definition of the word '"Party" and 
applicable to our statute is contained in the case 
of Fong Sik Leung v. Diilles, 226 F.2d 74, (C.A. 
Cal.) . The court defines the word party as follows: 
"In its broadest meaning the word party in-
cludes one concerned with, conducting, or tak-
ing part in any matter or proceeding, whether 
he is named or participates as formal party 
or not." 
The compensation carrier is an interested party 
whether or not it is a party to the action and wheth-
er or not a law suit is even commenced. This situ· 
ation, not contemplated by the McConnell case, is 
where a claim is settled with the Third Party with-
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out a law suit being filed by the injured employee 
or the compensation carrier. Clearly, the compensa-
tion carrier is a party interested in the outcome of 
these proceedings. 
If a Third Party claim were settled before suit 
then under the ruling of the McConnell case there 
would be no parties to apportion the cost against 
as set forth in sub-section 1 of the statute. There 
may however be attorney's fees incurred in the pro-
cess of securing the settlement. Clearly the Legis-
lature did not intend that a void be created in this 
area and it must be concluded that the word ''Party" 
means those interested in the outcome of the settle-
ment or the litigation. 
If, however, the compensation carrier is not re-
quired to bear its proportionate share of the at-
torneys fees incurred, then in that situation sub-
section 1 of the statute would have no meaning and 
would never be given effect. Clearly, the Legislature 
had in mind the application of both sub-section 1 
and sub-section 2. These two sections must be in-
terpreted together and all of their terms given ef-
fect.. In order to do so the word "Party" in sub-
section 1 must be applied to both the insurance car-
1·ier and the injured employee. 
The word "interest" in the first sub-section 
must also be given effect. 
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Assume a situation where an employee has 
received medical expense of $500.00 and compensa-
tion of $1,500.00 from the insurance carrier. He 
employs counsel to represent him in an action and 
agrees to pay the usual contingent fee of 1/3 of the 
amount recovered. Assume that the recovery is 
$2,400.00. This recovery is $400.00 greater than the 
total of compensation and medical expense paid by 
the carrier. To the extent of the $400.00 the in-
jured employee has an "interest" in the recovery. 
This is the interest that is mentioned in sub-section 
1 of the statute. The attorney's fee of 1/3 must be 
then applied against the recovery proportionately 
as the interest of the parties appears. If the 1/3 
contingent fee is first deducted from the recovery 
of $2,400.00, then, of course, the interest of the in-
jured workman is fully consumed and his interest 
in the excess over compensation and medical pay-
ments is used solely to pay attorney's fees and he 
receives nothing from his efforts in securing the 
recovery. He would then have no interest even though 
sub-section 1 specifically recognizes his interest in 
the recovery. 
Assume further that the recovery was for only 
the payments made by the compensation carrier. 
Since the carrier did not employ counsel then under 
the ruling of the M cC011ncl1 case, supra, the carrier 
would not be obligated to pay counsel because it 
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would be entitled to be paid in full. This is an in-
justice not intended by the legislature. 
We recognize that sub-section 2 of the statute 
1Jrovides that the insurance carrier must be reim-
bursed in full for all payments made. The intent 
of the Legislature in this sub-section is simply to 
provide that the injured employee will not receive 
a double benefit and that the compensation carrier 
will not be compelled to compromise its claim for 
payments. This may be best shown by illustration: 
Assume a case where substantial medical and com-
pensation payments were made but where the li-
ability of the Third Party was doubtful. The Third 
Party might well be willing to pay the compensa-
tion and medical payments made plus some small 
amount for general damage but unwilling to pay the 
full value of the injuries. On the other hand the 
injured employee may be willing to agree to such 
a settlement providing that the insurance carrier 
would compromise its claim for payments made. A 
trial judge might likely be sympathetic to the claim-
ant and attempt to apportion the various interests 
of the injured employee and the compensation car-
rier based upon the facts that liability of the Third 
Party was doubtful and that the case might well be 
lost if tried. It would be a temptation under those 
circumstances for a trial judge to compel the in-
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surance carrier to take less than its full claim and 
this is precisely what sub-section 2 of the statute 
is designed to prevent. 
This statute was not however designed to give 
the compensation carrier a free ride which is the re, 
sult under the McConnell. As the situation now e>. 0 
ists the compensation carrier need not and cannot 
be compelled to join in a Third Party suit, yet upon 
recovery, it is entitled to receive every cent paid out 
without bearing any of the burden of litigation. 
In order to give full effect to both sub-sections 
of the statute in all cases, it must be interpreted 
to mean that whenever an insurance carrier pays 
compensation and a Third Party claim results it 
must participate proportionately in the costs and at-
torney's fees incurred. 
Research into the various compensation laws of 
other states shows that they vary both in wording 
and intent from that of the Utah statute and hence 
the case law on this subject provides little in the 
way of precedent. There is one case, however, that 
is directly in point and supports the position of the 
Respondent here. In the case of Charles Seligman 
Distributing Company vs. Brown, 360 So. West 2nd 
509 (Ky. 1962) the injured workman sued a Third 
Party and recovered damages. The Kentucky sta-
tute provides that the ernuloyee has to reimburse 
the employer or his insurer for the amount paid out 
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as compensation. Reversing two prior cases of that 
Court the Court stated and held: 
" ... Moreover, regardless of the respective 
amounts recovered, where the employer or its 
insurer has a reasonable opportunity to inter-
vene in the employee's action against the 
Third Party tortfeasor, but chooses not to 
do so it would be inequitable to require the em-
ployee to bear the attorney fees on that por-
tion of the recovery which K.R.S. 342.055 
obliges him to pay over to the employer or its 
insurer ... " Supra at 510. 
In this case the State Insurance Fund was 
aware of the institution of this action and made no 
effort to intervene to recover its payments made. 
Under the ruling of the McConnell case, supra, it 
would never be necessary for the carrier to inter-
vene because the injured employee is obligated to 
reimburse the carrier in full. It is never responsible 
for payment of fees where the injured employee 
pulls the laboring oar. It is this injustice, not in-
tended by the legislature, that must be corrected. 
CONCLUSION 
In a Third Party recovery under the Work-
men's Compensation Statute it is provided: (1) That 
there shall first be deducted the expense of the ac-
tion including attorneys fees which shall be charged 
against the parties as their interests may appear 
and (2) That the compensation carrier shall be 
i·eimbursed in full for all payments made. Under 
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the McConnell case only sub-section 2 of the sta-
tute is given effect. As a practical matter the in-
surance carrier achieves the benefits of successful 
litigation or settlement but is under no obligation 
to pay the expense. 
The Legislature did not intend that the wol'd 
"Party" as used in sub-section 1 should be restrict-
ed in its meaning to only those situations where the 
insurance carrier is a party to the suit. This leaves 
open that vast number of cases that are settled with-
out litigation and where attorneys fees are incurred. 
Nor did the legislature intend the "interest" of 
the injured workman would be consumed in the pay-
ment of expense; and certainly it could not have 
been intended that no expense would be incurred 
by the carrier if the recovery did not exceed the 
payments made. 
The legislature intended that each party should 
pay its share of costs. This should apply whether 
the recovery is great or even where it does not ex-
ceed the payments made. The legislature further in-
tended in Sub-section 2 that the carrier could not 
be compelled to take less than its payments after 
deducting its share of the expense. 
This construction is the only one that accounts 
for the "interest" of each "party" in all actions 
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whether settled or filed and whether the recovery 
is great or small. Universal in application, it gives 
full force and effect to all terms of the statute. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
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